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1. INTRODUCTION

What role does marriage play in producing a person's identity? This
question is at the core of Angela Onwuachi-Willig's marvelous new book,
According to Our Hearts: Rhinelander v. Rhinelander and the Law of the
Multiracial Family.' Professor Onwuachi-Willig's book tells the story of
Rhinelander v. Rhinelander, a 1925 annulment case. 2 Like many annulment
cases of its day, Rhinelander revolved around fraud. 3 The plaintiff, Leonard
Kip Rhinelander, was a member of elite New York society; the defendant,
Alice Beatrice Jones Rhinelander, was a working-class woman Leonard met
by chance. 4 At trial, Leonard claimed Alice had fraudulently induced him to
marry her by falsely representing that she was white when in actuality she
was "colored." 5 Alice's lawyer won a victory at trial by having Alice admit
that she was colored and arguing that Leonard should have known thisthere could be no fraud if Alice had not fooled him. 6 The evidence famously
included Alice's partial disrobing before the jury and judge in a private room
to show that Leonard should have known based on her naked body that she
7
was not a white woman.
Although Alice "won" her case-and therefore was ultimately able to
obtain a small divorce settlement from Leonard instead of having her
marriage declared a nullity-Professor Onwuachi-Willig points out that
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Alice's win may have actually been a loss. 8 Alice appears to have been in
love with her husband; the publicity of the trial and the confession that she
was indeed "colored" were enough to undo their marriage by making it
socially, if not legally, impossible. 9 The Rhinelanders' marriage may have
been "real," but in so finding, the jury also reinforced the notion that race
was a purely biological construct with distinct physical markers, and may
have felt that that Alice's behavior-including engaging in premarital sex
with Leonard and writing him steamy love letters-was consistent with
racial stereotypes of black women as promiscuous and hypersexual.' 0 The
lesson of Rhinelander is that race, even if socially constructed, can seem so
indelible that it makes marriage impossible.
Why would this be so? What is it about marriage that links it so closely
to identity? According to Our Hearts gives us some interesting clues. In
considering the plight of contemporary mixed-race families, Professor
Onwuachi-Willig frequently refers to the "placelessness" these families
experience." Black-white couples are couples, but like all couples, they are
made up of two distinct individuals. As a couple, they take on a new racial
identity visible to the outside world.' 2 But as individuals they lose
something; each member of the couple is now no longer associated primarily
with his or her racial group or community. 13 Identity has simultaneously
been expanded and retracted, often contrary to the preferences of the
couple.14 As Professor Onwuachi-Willig shows, this new identity can have
sweeping social and legal consequences. A mixed-race couple may have
difficulty finding a place where they can be "seen"--store clerks and
restaurant servers will assume that they are not a couple, making comments
with (perhaps unintentional) double meanings, such as "[a]re you
together?"' 15 And mixed-race couples can find it difficult to find a
neighborhood where they can live without social awkwardness or
6
harassment, and are sometimes even turned away by landlords altogether.'
Even with legal protections in place, such as the Fair Housing Act, de facto
segregation lives on, and this segregation can make being a mixed-race
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couple uncomfortable, stressful, and challenging. 7
Professor Onwuachi-Willig's book is a fascinating exposition of
contemporary racial politics viewed through the lens of mixed-race
marriage. It also provides an unusual lens through which to view modem
marriage, one that this essay explores further. When is a marriage not a
marriage? One answer suggested by According to Our Hearts is that a
marriage is not a marriage when it transgresses the tacit societal consensus
regarding what marriage is. 18 Legally, a marriage is not a marriage if it can
be annulled. 19 However, this essay will show that what counts for annulment
has changed over the years. Annulment law reflects changing societal
attitudes about which relationships are so far beyond the bounds of the
legally cognizable that they cannot be acknowledged.
This essay will evaluate how societal expectations for marriage have
changed by exploring changes in annulment law. The Rhinelander case
occurs at a pivotal point in this history: a time in which marriage was
moving from an economic, community-oriented institution to a private,
personal expression of identity. 20 The central claim of this essay is that
understanding annulment law can help us understand the function marriage
currently serves in our culture. In a society with no-fault divorce, we might
see the end of annulment: legislatures might abolish it, or judges might
narrow its availability to make it functionally nonexistent. But that has not
happened; people still seek annulments, just for different reasons than they
used to. 2 1 So if annulment has not come to an end, what is its "end" in that
word's other sense-what is its purpose or aim? Understanding why
annulment remains important, legally and culturally-and the goals of
people who seek it-can help us to understand how marriage forges and
alters people's identities.
II.

WHAT

Is

ANNULMENT?

Courts grant divorces when a marriage is over. In the days of faultbased divorce, this was generally when one spouse had "breached" the
marital contract by committing an act that was grounds for divorcetypically adultery, desertion, or extreme cruelty. 22 In a fault-based divorce,

17.

Id. at 188.

18.

See, e.g., id. at 123.

19.

DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 463-64 (3d ed. 2012).

20.

See infra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.

21.

See infra Part I1.

22.

See LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, LEE E. TEITELBAUM & JUNE CARBONE, FAMILY LAW 292-300

(4th ed. 2010) (describing fault-based divorce and common grounds for it).

The Journalof Gender, Race & Justice

[16:2013]

the innocent and injured spouse often received compensation, usually in the
form of maintenance payments or property division. 23 Today, as all states
have some form of no-fault divorce available, property division and
maintenance usually depend more on need and contribution than fault.24
In contrast, courts grant annulments only when they determine that no
marriage legally existed.25 The grant of an annulment essentially signifies
that there was something so un-marriage-like about the so-called marriage
that the law cannot recognize it as valid.26 Unlike divorce, the remedy for a
marriage that failed, annulment is the remedy for a marriage that simply was
not. 27

Traditionally, courts granted annulments only for very limited reasons,
such as impotence, incapacity, nonage, or consanguinity. 28 Broader
annulment grounds would have allowed individuals to avoid the obligations
of marriage. A husband, for example, could avoid dividing property or
paying maintenance to his wife if he could show that the marriage never

actually existed, and children of the marriage might be rendered
illegitimate. 29 These consequences have become less dire in recent years,
because legislatures and courts have increasingly treated annulments and

divorces as functional equivalents, and because courts are increasingly
granting marriage-like remedies to cohabitants upon dissolution of their
relationships. 30 But when annulment doctrine was still developing, the
difference between an annulment and a divorce could be substantial. 3'

Celebrities and others who can earn vast amounts of income in a short period
of time still occasionally seek annulments-a ten-month marriage could
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result in an expensive divorce for a spouse who earns $1 million a month,
while an annulment would be less costly.
An important feature of early annulment cases was the extent to which
they focused on enforcing the public functions of marriage. Several grounds
for annulment, such as incapacity, duress, or nonage, are based on a
requirement of consent.32 The thought was that a person making a
commitment as important and life-long as marriage had to be able to legally
consent to assume its burdens and obligations. 33 Other grounds, such as
consanguinity (close blood ties, as in sibling marriage) or impotence,
underscored marriage's social and legal role as the approved site for sexual
and procreative relationships. 34 A person who could not engage in sex or
procreation, or a couple for whom procreation could be disruptive to the
social or genetic order, was prevented from marrying-or from having the
marriage recognized if they did marry-because such a marriage disserved
35
the public.
Very rarely did the subjective desires of a particular spouse matter in
annulment law. However, one annulment ground did provide a potential
avenue for these desires-the ground of fraud. After all, a lie that might
fraudulently induce one person into marrying might not work on another.
But even in cases of fraud, most courts allowed only very narrow categories
of lies to undo a marriage; these types of lies closely tracked the other
annulment grounds, focusing on lies about sex and procreation. 36 As
Professor Onwuachi-Willig notes in According to Our Hearts, courts have
repeatedly held that "'incontinence, temper, idleness, extravagance, coldness
or fortune cannot serve as the basis for an annulment"37 and
misrepresentations "about financial means or social position [do] not go to
38
the essence of marriage."
Here is an example: Imagine a man claimed before and during his
marriage that he graduated from college with honors (not true), was a partner
at a major accounting firm (but was really only a junior accountant), was a
highly-decorated Korean War hero (he did not serve in conflict), was a
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United States Air Force Officer and Pilot (but was only an enlisted man),
and that he received the Congressional Medal of Honor (false). He also told
his future wife that he never drank or did drugs (wrong), and that he was not
violent (when he had been convicted of felonious atrocious assault for
shooting his previous wife).39
Under the fraud doctrine familiar from contract law, a person
attempting to void a marriage contract with this person (i.e., the man's
unfortunate wife) would have to show: (1) that he made assertions not in
accord with facts; here, that he was an honors graduate, partner at his firm,
war hero, sober, and nonviolent; (2) that these facts were fraudulent or
material; here, that he knew that his statements were false and that he
intended to mislead her; (3) that she relied on the misstatements to her
detriment; here, that she believed him, married him, and now is stuck being
married to someone who is slowly draining her bank account, is unreliable
and violent, and may take her property with him in a divorce; and (4) that
her reliance was justified; here, that it was not foolish for her to believe him,
or that she could not have easily investigated and refuted his claims on her
own.4 0 Although a plaintiffs ability to win on these facts based on pure
contract principles might vary depending on the circumstances, one could
imagine that some plaintiffs in these circumstances would have a winning
case. Yet the law of annulment treats fraud very differently from run-of-themill contract law-so differently, in fact, that a plaintiff would almost never
win on these facts.
In Summers v. Renz, for example, the 2004 case from which these facts
were taken, the court denied the wife an annulment. 4 1 The "essentials of the
marriage," the court held, were fulfilled for ten years, until the wife
discovered that her husband had shot his previous wife.42 Although the court
did not devote any time to considering what the "essentials" of marriage
might include, the essentials test is long-standing and well developed in
many jurisdictions, including California, where Summers arose. 43 Put
simply, the "essentials" of the marriage, for purposes of annulment law, are
44
sexual activity and procreation.
Annulment doctrine, then, allowed a very narrow sliver of marriages to
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end based on "fraud" or other impediments. The doctrine provided an escape
from particularly untenable situations in which sexual activity and
procreation could not, or would not, occur within marriage.4 5 The essentials
doctrine may have systematically favored men, as the annulment grounds
prohibited by law included ones that women seem more likely to assert:
misrepresentations about wealth, criminal records, or propensities towards
violence or drug abuse. 46
Courts may have been particularly careful about creating end-runs
around tough divorce rules for two reasons. The first was an intuition that
courting couples make misrepresentations routinely.4 7 A particular problem
with applying contract principles to marriages is the tendency of courting
couples to exaggerate or "puff." As one judge put it:
If every misrepresentation made by the wooer or the wooed were
to pave the way to a courthouse for a disappointed spouse suddenly
made aware of unsuspected and deliberately concealed frailties of
the other, society would indeed have reached a pretty pass. Shall
the wife be entitled to nullify her solemnly accepted status if,
forsooth, in the face of previous protestations to the contrary, her
husband reveals himself as the possessor of a bewitching glass eye
or a set of pearly false teeth, or shall to the husband be extended a
similar privilege if his once-gorgeous blonde has mysteriously
gone brunette? Of course not, for such fraud has not the slightest
bearing on the objectives of matrimony. . . . "Fraudulent
misrepresentations .... as to birth, social position, fortune, good
health, and temperament, cannot therefore vitiate the contract.
'4 8
Caveat emptor is the harsh but necessary maxim of the law."
This analysis recognizes something important about marriage: although
parties to contracts routinely "puff' to a certain extent in their negotiations
with one another, we expect romantic partners to show themselves in their
best light because they are trying to do something more difficult than just get
a consumer to buy a product-they are trying to get someone else to fall in
love. Dating couples make misrepresentations about themselves all the time:
"I'm not a smoker" sometimes means "I smoke in the evenings"; "I've only
had sex with two other people" sometimes means five; "I'm a real-estate
developer" sometimes means I have a mortgage I can't pay; "I'm separated"
means I've been thinking about leaving my spouse. People also commit sins
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of omission, failing to mention that they have a sexually transmitted disease,
or that their mother isn't really Jewish, or that they have doubts about their
sexual attraction to their potential marriage partner, or, for that matter, that
they have doubts about their own sexual orientation. And it is also harder to
pinpoint the moment that bargaining begins. Romantic relationships may not
have a clear-cut beginning, and even if they do, they may not feel like an
"arms-length" negotiation when they are going on.
Annulment for fraud, then, had to be a narrow doctrine or it threatened
to envelop most pre-marital representations. A second, and perhaps more
important reason for its scope, was that annulment for fraud doctrine
developed during a time in which marriage was the only legally and socially
sanctioned site for sex and procreation. 9 To make this system work, people
needed to get married and stay married. But they also needed assurance that
marriage would involve the important social function they anticipated it
would. Marriage was the primary means by which the law dealt with
dependency, especially the dependency of women and children. 50 Sex and
procreation were criminalized outside of marriage.5 1 Allowing husbands or
wives to escape their marital obligations might lead to an untenable number
of impoverished women, but providing no escape hatch whatsoever from a
non-sexual or non-procreative marriage would deprive individuals of the
52
only legal means by which they could engage in sex or have children.
Annulment was necessary, but it could not provide too easy an escape from
marriage.
The limitation on divorce during the fault-based era meant that
annulments played an important role in the law of legal separation. People
who were not entitled to a divorce might nevertheless obtain an annulment. 3
As Lawrence Friedman has shown, divorce was so difficult to get in New
York that by the 1950s, the number of annulments outstripped divorces in
ten New York counties, and rivaled the number of divorces in the rest of the
state. 4 And New York, a state with a much stricter divorce law than most,
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developed a much more lenient annulment law.55 In New York, a person
seeking an annulment based on fraud did not need to limit his or her claim to
fraud that went to the "essentials" of marriage: any "material" misstatement
or omission was fair game 56 -and this was the law that applied to the
Rhinelander case. 57 This New York doctrinal aberration suggests that
annulments functioned as a kind of safety valve when the local divorce law
did not keep up with modem mores. Even in New York, however,
misrepresentations as to income were not enough to obtain a fraud-based
annulment; had Alice Rhinelander claimed to be wealthy, for example,
58
Leonard Rhinelander would have had no case to bring.
Traditional annulment law, then, was generally narrow, allowing escape
from marriage only in circumstances where marriage was untenable. These
reasons were public-spirited; it was in the public interest, for example, to
confine sex and reproduction into marriage, and individuals therefore needed
59
to be given an opportunity to have a marriage that included these elements.
Marriages entered into based on lies that preyed on the more idiosyncratic
preferences of particular spouses would not qualify for annulment, even if it
was clear that the spouse would never have married had he or she known the
pertinent information.
III.

EXPRESSIVE ANNULMENT

Sometime in the mid-twentieth-century, annulment law changed
substantially. As Professor Onwuachi-Willig notes in According to Our
Hearts, "[d]uring the era of restrictive, fault-based divorces, annulments
served a very important purpose, as they provided the primary-and in some
cases, the only-mechanism for people to dissolve their marriages." 60 This
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was especially true in New York, where adultery was the only available
ground for divorce until 1967.61 The newly-reformed divorce laws of the
1970s dramatically expanded the available exit options for couples in
unhappy marriages, "making the need for the remedy of annulment less
necessary than it was during the time of the Rhinelanders[,] '' 62 which in turn
led to a decline in "collusive" divorces and a decline in the number of
annulments sought. The increased availability of divorce made an especially
dramatic difference in states with high annulment rates. Consider again the
case of New York, which had an unusually high ratio of annulments to
divorce. 63 In 1950, for example, courts in the State of New York granted
6604 divorces and 4599 annulments, making annulment almost as
significant a way to "end" a marriage as divorce.' By 1969, when New
York had expanded its grounds beyond just adultery, annulments made up
only 10.3% of all cases, and by 1979, this figure had dropped to 1.7/-higher, but not drastically so, than the national average that year of 0.8%.65
Annulments also became less important to Catholics; many Catholics are
now legally divorced, yet still meet the criteria for a papal annulment.66 The
fact that a marriage ended in divorce and not annulment does not affect the
Church's jurisdiction over determining the religious meaning of the
67
marriage.
One might think that with the advent of no-fault divorce, annulment
would disappear entirely. Yet the annulment doctrine has lingered. In fact,
some courts have actually begun to expand the "essentials" doctrine in ways
that stretch it beyond recognition. Most of these expansions occur in cases
that implicate individuals' core personal identities, such as the desire to
avoid being a parent, sexual orientation, or national citizenship. 68 Courts'
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willingness to expand annulment law in this direction may indicate a new
understanding of the purpose of marriage.
For example, in a New Jersey case, a husband promised his wife prior
to marriage that he did not want to have children. 69 Once married, however,
he refused to have intercourse using contraceptives. 70 Under the traditional
"essentials" test, the wife's claim for fraud would have gone nowhere. The
husband's misrepresentation did not prevent her from achieving the
"essentials" of the marriage through having procreative sex; in fact, this is
exactly what he wanted to engage in. 71 If the public purpose of marriage was
to provide a legally approved site for sex and reproduction, she was the one
at fault, not he. But the court disagreed. "What is essential to the relationship
of the parties in one marriage may be of considerably less significance in
another," it explained.72 To further explain its decision, the court turned the
"essentials" test inside out:
It is axiomatic that.., a party will be entitled to an annulment
when the spouse refuses to have children. This court now finds that
the converse is also true, i.e., given proper proof, a party will be
entitled to an annulment when the spouse insists on having
children, contrary to the express agreement of the parties prior to
3
marriage that they would not have children.
More recently, courts have granted annulments where one spouse fails
to disclose that he or she is gay. 74 One court, for example, explained that a
wife's desire for "unnatural intercourse" with her husband was "repugnant to
75
and destructive of the basic purpose and terms of the marriage covenant.,
When combined with evidence of her lesbian activity prior to the marriage,
this evidence was sufficient to prove fraud.76
Inone case, In re Marriageof Ramirez, the court justified the grant of
an annulment by claiming that marital infidelity-traditionally a ground for
fault-based divorce-now falls within the essentials test. 77 There, the
husband, Jorge, married Lilia even though he had begun a love affair with
Lilia's sister, Blanca, which he intended to continue even after marrying

69.
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Lilia.7 8 The court acknowledged the traditional means and use of annulment.
"Historically," the court claimed, "annulments based on fraud have only
been granted in cases where the fraud relates in some way to the sexual,
procreative or child-rearing aspects of marriage."79 True enough. But then,
the court went much further: "Jorge's actions here, in marrying Lilia while
continuing to carry on a sexual relationship with her sister Blanca, directly
relates to a sexual aspect of marriage-sexual fidelity." 8° Thus, infidelity,
traditionally thought of as an aspect of "character" or "personality" and not
something that prevents a married couple from engaging in sex, is now not
only grounds for divorce but also annulment. Ramirez generated a heated
dissent. 81 The dissenting judge opined that the "majority holds that infidelity
alone, disdainful as it may be, may serve as a basis for annulment on the
ground of fraud ....Today's decision could have unintended repercussions

in family law practice ....82 If anyone who doubts his or her ability to
remain faithful in marriage can now have the marriage annulled for fraud
when the doubts prove true, annulment would indeed expand dramatically.
Some courts have also broadened the essentials test to encompass
immigration fraud. 83 "Green card marriages" would appear on their face to
be little different from marriages where a person marries for money or social
standing. Under the traditional "essentials of the marriage" test, courts
should deny annulments in these cases, provided that the immigrant spouse
was willing to have procreative sexual relations with the citizen spouseand indeed, many have. 84
Often, however, appellate courts have granted or upheld annulments
based on green card fraud. California has been in the vanguard of this trend,
stretching its "essentials of the marriage" test to include most green card

78.

Id. at 181-82.

79.

Id. at 185.

80.

Id.

81.

concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 186 (Gaut, J.,

82.

Id. at 186.

83.

See infra notes 84-96.

84.
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Sept. 16, 2008) (upholding trial court's denial of an annulment where husband claimed wife married
him solely for a green card); Helsel v. Helsel, 723 P.2d 963 (Mont. 1986) (reversing the trial court's
grant of annulment where wife threw husband out of their apartment as soon as she received her
green card; court held that this was not evidence of fraud); Verhage v. Verhage, No. 12-04-00309CV, 2006 WL 1791565 (Tex. App. June 30, 2006) (reversing trial court's decree of annulment based
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Ganji, No. 2660-00-4, 2001 WL 435625 (Va. Ct. App. May 1, 2001) (denying annulment denied
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v. Radochonski, 91 Wash. App. 1001 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that fraud did not go to the essentials

of the marriage where a wife married her husband to get a green card).
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cases. 85 This pattern began with the 1974 case of Rabie v. Rabie, in which an
American wife accused her Iranian husband of marrying her solely for a
green card.86 The court's broad holding, that an annulment was justified
because the husband never intended to fulfill his marital duties, "especially
'87
the duties to remain faithful to [her] and remain married to her[,]
threatened to create an exception to swallow the rule: presumably many
people marry with an intention or a suspicion that they may not remain
faithful, but the traditional remedy for that has been a fault-based divorce for
adultery, 88 not an annulment for fraud. And even more people may marry
thinking, in this age of no-fault divorce, that they may not remain married
forever. This belief is not fraud, but an accurate understanding of what the
law requires of them (or doesn't). How can the intent to legally terminate a
status make the status void?
The Rabie court justified its holding by citing to an earlier case,
Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles v. Schaub, in which a thirtyfour-year-old woman married a sixty-year-old man solely to gain access to
his property. 89 She entered into the marriage as part of a scheme with her
lover, a Mr. Scott, and continued to flagrantly visit Scott throughout the
marriage. 90 In upholding the district court's grant of an annulment, the
appellate court emphasized that the case was "exceptional." 9' Mrs. Schaub,
unlike other women who had engaged in premarital relations, had
demonstrated "no repentance, no reformation, and no desire to seek the
92
shelter of an honorable married life as a means of escape from the past."
Had the court not intervened, Mr. Schaub would be saddled with an immoral
and unrepentant leech for the rest of his life.
Schaub's holding appeared to be an extreme exception to the general
rule, as courts largely ignored it and continued to apply the traditional
"essentials of marriage" test. 93 Not so with Rabie. Since the Rabie decision,
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California courts have annulled "green card" marriages in case after case,
essentially carving out an exception to the usual test if immigration status, as
opposed to social or economic status, is at issue.
In many of these immigration fraud cases, the "essentials" test need not
be stretched very far to make out a case for annulment. 94 Most commonly,
the fraud is characterized as going to the essentials of the marriage because it
involved a secret desire not to consummate the marriage. In one case, for
example, a court granted an annulment where a Czech husband refused to
have sex with his American wife and told her it was because she was
obese. 95 When she lost sixty-five pounds and he continued to demur, the
wife became suspicious that he had married her only to obtain legal
immigration status. 96 In these cases, even applying the traditional essentials
test, a court could conclude that the immigrant spouse never intended to
engage in procreative sex with the citizen spouse. The motive of a green
card might be further evidence of this, but it would not be the reason for the
annulment.
In other cases, however, courts have held immigration fraud alone as
sufficient to sustain an annulment. 97 These cases stretch the essentials test
almost beyond recognition and characterize remaining in the marriage (or
getting a quick no-fault divorce, easily available in California) as
unbearable. As one court put it, "where fraud is so grievous that it places the
injured party in an intolerable relationship, it robs the marital contract of all
validity." 98 This holding is especially striking when compared to Summers v.
Renz, the case discussed in Part I in which the husband neglected to mention
he had been convicted for shooting his previous wife, and lied about his
99
college education, career, war service, honors, and drug and alcohol use.
Some relationships, apparently, are more "intolerable" than others.
Kurys v. Kurys, 209 A.2d 526, 528 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965) (holding that "if an alien marries a
citizen of this country for the only purpose of entering the United States, and without any intention
of assuming the duties and responsibilities of the marriage, in a proper case an annulment may be
decreed"); Seirafi-Pour v. Bagherinassab, 197 P.3d 1097, 1101 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008) (holding that

circumstantial evidence indicated that the wife never intended to engage in marital sex with the
husband; the husband claimed that the marriage was never consummated; the wife told co-workers
she was single, complained about her new husband's age, appearance, and the way he walked, and
left her husband only nine days after getting her green card; further, the husband hired a computer
forensic recovery specialist that recovered logs of chats between wife and someone with the tag
"Pentagon 666 2000"-presumably her Iranian boyfriend).
94.
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One inevitable consequence of abandoning the formality of the
"essentials" test is that judges have to inject themselves into the mindset of
the parties to the marriage, imagining what they would have wanted to know
and how they would have felt just prior to marriage-and they may well be
mistaken. In one case, for example, a court granted an annulment to a
husband who met his wife over the internet. 100 Shortly after the wedding, the
wife demanded that the husband sponsor her for a green card, and the
marriage broke down soon thereafter. 10 1The trial court found that the wife's
determination to get a green card on the very same day she got married to be
persuasive evidence of her motivation to marry solely for a green card.'0 2
"On the day you get married," the court opined, "rather than discuss making
a home, finding a place to live, having children, starting a relationship, a
green card is one of your first things you list on the day of your
marriage. ' 'I °3 But why shouldn't it be? If "making a home" is an important
goal, a green card could very well be a prerequisite; there will be no joint
home if one spouse is deported. In fact, in some cases, the need for a green
card might dictate the date of a couple's wedding. 0 4 And do people really
begin to discuss in detail "having children" or "starting a relationship" on
their wedding day? Haven't most people already discussed these things, or if
they have not, do we really think they bring it up immediately after their
marriage ceremony?
In all of these cases-those involving mistaken or misunderstood sexual
orientation, a desire to be childless, the failure to be faithful, or an
immigration-status motive-the traditional doctrine would have disallowed
annulments for the same reason it forbade them in cases of social or
economic fraud. Courts might suspect that in many of these cases, the
allegedly defrauded spouse knew or at least suspected that the marriage
might have problems, and decided to marry anyway. The "puffing" engaged
in by the supposed liar may have been aspirational, hopeful, and even
sincere. It is difficult enough for the members of a couple to know what they
are thinking and feeling when they enter into a marriage; it is even more
difficult for an outsider to discern those motives looking back, sometimes
years later.
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But something about these cases is so repugnant to judges that they are
willing to find fraud even where the traditional doctrine appears to deny this
form of relief. Judges are granting what we might call "expressive
annulments"-repudiations of marriages deemed so far beyond the pale that
a no-fault divorce cannot undo the dignitary harm suffered by the duped
spouse. In the next Part, I speculate that the reason for this may be that
marriage has taken on a new meaning, an identity-producing one, in which
the recognition of a fraudulent marriage can harm someone's personal
integrity.
IV. RELATIONAL IDENTITY

Annulment doctrine is not the only aspect of marriage that has changed
in the past century. Historians and sociologists have shown that marriage
itself has changed. 1° 5 Marriage used to be an economic arrangement, and
although husbands and wives might feel affection for each other, the marital
relationship was not the be-all and end-all of a person's social identity.
People lived in large extended families and sought emotional satisfaction
and friendship from a variety of sources, not necessarily from their spouses.
As William O'Neill put it, families were "large and loose, arouse[d] few
' 10 6
expectations, and ma[d]e few demands."
The married couple as part of a larger economic household began to
shift in the nineteenth century toward the cozy couples we know today. As
Stephanie Coontz has shown, the Victorian Era, for all of its notorious
prudishness, was actually an era of radical experimentation on the marriage
front.107 "The Victorians," she writes, "were the first people in history to try
to make marriage the pivotal experience in people's lives and married love
the principal focus of their emotions, obligations, and satisfactions." 108 Men
and women began to expect more of their marriages, hoping to obtain
emotional, intellectual, and even spiritual fulfillment in them. 10 9 However,
Coontz also argues that the rigid gender roles of the Victorian Era were an
impediment to this kind of satisfaction for many couples; when men and
women inhabited such "separate sphere" in their everyday lives, it was
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difficult for them to connect enough to satisfy each other's every need. 0
But by the late twentieth century, these gender roles had been largely
tossed aside. Sociologist Andrew Cherlin has identified the 1960s as the
dawn of an age of "Individualized marriage" and "expressive divorce.""' By
the 1960s, Cherlin argues, a new "cultural model of individualism" had
arisen, one that held that "self-development and personal satisfaction are key
rewards of an intimate partnership."" 2 In this model of marriage, a
partnership is expected to provide a person with "the opportunity to develop
your sense of who you are and to express that sense through your relations
with your partner. If it does not, then you should end it."1 3 Thus, we see not
only "expressive individualism" in marriage but "expressive divorce. 114
Cherlin explains that "if a person finds that he or she has changed since
marriage in a direction different from the one his or her spouse has taken,
then that person is justified in leaving the marriage in order to express this
newer, fuller sense of self.""' 5
All of these changes mean two important things for understanding
marriage and the law of marriage. First, there is less of a public interest in an
individual marriage. A wife is less likely to find herself destitute upon
divorce (although this certainly does happen), and since sexual expression is
available both in and out of marriage, there is nothing particularly troubling
about a person remarrying and having sexual relations with someone new.
Second, there is much more of an individual interest in marriage. Marriages
are personal projects entered into together by autonomous individuals. These
projects are important to crafting and staking out these individuals' own
identities, and it is important for these projects to accurately reflect the
spouses' current, chosen forms of self-expression. In other words, the
historical changes in marriage in the past two centuries do not make
marriage less a part of a person's identity. If anything, marriage can be more
identity-producing: marriage has become in some ways the ultimate selfexpression.
The Rhinelanders' case occurred in the midst of these dramatic
changes. Thus, as Professor Onwuachi-Willig shows, Rhinelander has
elements of both visions of marriage. The interracial union of Alice and
Leonard was a public problem, for it threatened to destabilize rigid ideas
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about race. "6 Professor Onwuachi-Willig shows in detail in According to
Our Hearts how the jury's verdict-while on its face a win for Aliceactually reified an ideology of racial difference. 117 If Leonard "knew, or at
least should have known" that Alice was colored, it was because being
"colored" was something obvious, something the jurors could see with their
8
own eyes. 11
But for the Rhinelander couple, marriage may also have been a
self-expression of identity. Leonard may have been attempting to forge a
new identity for himself, independent of a wealthy family. Alice may have
been, consciously or not, attempting to stake her claim as a "white" person
in a world where with whiteness came the possibility of wealth and respect.
This identity-producing aspect of marriage is a theme that threads its
way through According to Our Hearts. Professor Onwuachi-Willig shows
that marriage carries with it a social meaning not present with being a friend
or a co-worker. 119 As she puts it, "individuals in intimate, interracial
[relationships] often experience daily disadvantages and microaggressions as
well as blatant and subtle forms of actionable discrimination in their private
lives as a result of their union." 120 Marriage, she argues, can alter a person's
identity in ways that have concrete social and legal consequences. To
support her argument, she quotes Professor Ali Mazrui, who asserts that
Barack Obama may have been legitimated in the eyes of black voters by his
marriage to Michelle, who is "the descendent of slaves in the United States
and a dark-skinned (not a light-skinned) woman who grew up on the South
Side of Chicago."'' Had he been married to a white woman, however, he
22
very well might never have become president. 1
Another example offered by Onwuachi-Willig is Professor Heather
Dalmage's story of how marrying a black man altered her own racial
identity, changing her from a "white" woman to a person with "no other
racial identity ...to claim."' 23 Dalmage explained: "racial identities are
formed in part through our experiences. . . .my experiences are vastly
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different from other white women."' 24 She cited experiences such as "being
seated in the back of restaurants, being denied loans, being steered out of
white neighborhoods when [they] search[ed] for housing, being pulled over
for no reason, and facing hostility 2from
racist whites [as] experiences most
5
white people never contend with." 1
Despite the ways in which marriage can alter a person's identity,
Professor Onwuachi-Willig shows how the law often refuses to recognize
the claims of individuals who are harmed, not by their own race, but by their
involvement in an interracial relationship.' 26 Professor Onwuachi-Willig
critiques this limit in the law, arguing that by framing legal claims in this
way, the law "anticipates only temporary connections and effects from
cross-racial, work interactions, rather than the long-term or lifelong
connections and impacts that occur within families."' 27 It is not just that
marriage creates a new partnership-just as incorporation creates a legal
"person." Professor Onwuachi-Willig's important insight is that the
existence of this new partnership actually alters the identity of the
individuals who are party to it. Her book is filled with examples of how
marriage affects an individual's identity in the context of interracial
marriage. 12 Through her analysis of court opinions, media reports, and
numerous self-conducted interviews, Professor Onwuachi-Willig shows how
participation in an interracial marriage changes the way others understand
and perceive a person and, in turn, his or her own understanding of self
Professor Onwuachi-Willig draws on her own experiences as one half of an
interracial couple, revealing how the discovery that she has a white husband
changes other people's perceptions of her own race: "my liberal politics and
appearance initially identify me as one who is authentically black, but my
choice in a life partner, which indicates my willingness to be placed in
deliberate proximity to whiteness, somehow destabilizes my racial
identity." 129
If marriage is now inextricably intertwined with personal expression
and identity, it should be no surprise that annulment doctrine, and attitudes
about annulment, would reflect this trend. Many courts are stretching the
"essentials of marriage" doctrine to include aspects of marriage that are
idiosyncratic to the couple in question, aspects that never would have been
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considered "essentials" one hundred years ago.' 30 Professor OnwuachiWillig's book shows that this trend is not only a judicial one. Toward the
end of According to Our Hearts, she discusses a poll she conducted of
twenty-seven undergraduate students at the University of Iowa.' 3' Eerily,
their attitudes toward annulment closely track the judicial trend.
Professor Onwuachi-Willig explained to students the difference
between annulment and divorce, and that fraud that "goes to the essence of
marriage" justifies annulment.' 32 She then asked them to decide whether
they thought annulment was justified in each of several hypotheticals. 133 In
each hypothetical, a couple had dated for a year before they married, but the
individuals in the couple had never met each other's families before they
married. By at least the third month of the marriage, one of the individuals
file for an
discovered a fact about his or her partner that caused him or her 3to
5
annulment. 134 The only variable was the newly discovered fact. 1
The results of Professor Onwuachi-Willig's poll are fascinating and
consistent with the instincts of judges as shown in the annulment cases
discussed previously. 136 Of the twenty-seven students, only two thought that
annulment was justified when a husband discovered that his "white-looking"
wife kept the fact that she was half black a secret from him until after they
got married.' 37 The second most unpopular grounds for annulment was
laziness. Only five students thought an annulment was warranted due to a
wife's disappointment when her "once sixty-hour-per-week-working fiancre
quit his job almost immediately after they got married to sit on the couch
every day, drink beer, and watch sports."' 138 The most common traditional
annulment grounds, impotence and infertility, garnered fifteen and twelve
votes for annulment, respectively. 39 In fact, lying about wealth-which
courts do not generally hold to be fraud that goes to the "essentials" of
marriage-did just as well, getting fifteen student votes. 140 The only two
types of fraud that received a large majority of the votes were a wife's lying
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about "being a male-to-female transsexual" (seventeen out of twenty-seven
voted for annulment) and a "husband's discovery that his wife is not an
American citizen after she stopped having sex with him and hanging out
with him upon marriage" (twenty-four out of twenty-seven voted for
annulment). 141
What is going on here? Why do students (and judges) find lies about
citizenship, motives, and sexual orientation or gender identity to be more
harmful to the integrity of marriage than lies about procreation, sexual
ability, wealth, and laziness much more harmful than lies about race? One
answer may be that citizenship, gender, and sexual identity have more to do
with contemporary understandings of identity-and marital identity in
particular-than many of these other characteristics. If marriage is a project
of personal self-fulfillment and expression, then finding out that the person
you married was never actually physically attracted to you (because of
sexual orientation) or used to be a different gender could be remarkably
destabilizing to one's sense of self. If marriage is a joint project, in which
goals and desires specific to the couple can be brought to fruition, it is not
surprising that judges would find lying about the desire not to procreate to be
just as important as lies about one's ability or willingness to do so. And if
marriage is central to a person's core identity, finding out that your spouse
married you only to obtain a different identity-like U.S. citizenship-might
feel like the ultimate betrayal.
Indeed, it is the annulment cases dealing with immigration and
citizenship status that can be most fascinating, not only because they
represent the largest number of cases showing a new ground for annulment,
but also because of the visceral reaction judges and students alike seem to
have to these cases. We may not consciously think of marriage as a form of
citizenship, but we may well think of it as an identity-producing relationship,
one that changes us in the ways that a change in nationality might.142 So
finding oneself tied to a person who didn't intend to forge a new identity
through the marriage, but instead intended to use the marriage to get a
particular legal identity, feels like a betrayal, almost an infidelity.
Why would a lie about immigration status be worse than a lie about
wealth? Remember how the California courts grant annulments for the first
kind of lie but not the second, and that twenty-four of the twenty-seven
students surveyed would grant an annulment for lying about citizenship but
only fifteen would for a lie about wealth. 14 3 It may be that the cases simply
are not analogous. In the wealth cases, it is the supposedly-wealthy person
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who lies, and the "gold-digger" finds him or herself stuck with a poorerthan-expected spouse. But in the citizenship cases, it is not the person with
the asset (citizenship) who is lying. There are no annulment cases, to my
knowledge, brought by an immigrant based on a spouse's false claim of
citizenship. Rather, it is the citizen spouse who was duped into thinking that
the immigrant spouse really loved him, rather than his citizenship.
But there may also be another important distinction between wealth and
citizenship. Wealth is something that can come and go; indeed, the
popularity of "for richer or for poorer" in the marriage vows taken by
couples speaks to the common cultural understanding that wealth can be
transient and that marriages should outlast financial troubles, regardless if it
is actually true. Immigration status is different. Once an immigrant has
obtained lawful permanent resident status based on marriage, he or she can
144
divorce the sponsoring spouse and apply for citizenship on his or her own.
The marriage can be used in a purely instrumental fashion and discarded
once the desired result has been obtained. It is harder to manipulate wealth
in this fashion. Even if a person married someone solely for his or her
money, he or she would have to stay married for years in order to acquire
enough of an interest in marital property incurred during the marriage to
make a divorce for money pay off. But a newly-married immigrant can
divorce a sponsoring spouse after only two years of marriage, as soon as a
green card has been obtained; indeed, absent evidence of marriage fraud, an
immigrant can even divorce a citizen spouse during the two-year waiting
period and still walk away with legal papers.' 45 This kind of fraud may be
one of the purest examples of using a spouse for ulterior motives, a kind of
identity theft through marriage. If marriage is anything today, it is a
commitment to a joint project-whatever that project may be. For someone
seeking an annulment today, the "end" or goal of annulment may be to
reclaim his or her pre-marital identity.
V. CONCLUSION

Annulment cases such as Rhinelander, as Professor Onwuachi-Willig
explicates so beautifully in According to OurHearts, are like a palimpsest of
marriage mores. Again and again, courts inscribe new notions of what
marriage is into the body of annulment doctrine. At the same time, the old
meanings linger on in phrases such as the "essentials of marriage,"
constraining the ways in which judges can talk about marriage. In some
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instances, as in the transsexual and green card annulment cases, the doctrine
makes room for new understandings of marriage.
But in other circumstances, annulment doctrine may not track the social
realities of what people expect from marriage. For instance, does Professor
Onwuachi-Willig's discovery that students no longer believe that lies about
race should be the basis of annulment mean that race is no longer a salient
part of marital identity? According to Our Hearts suggests that the answer is
emphatically "no." Professor Onwuachi-Willig argues that a legal change
has occurred that makes race-based annulment impossible now. 146 Courts
are generally no longer willing to give weight to the "private biases" that
may exist in the world; as the Supreme Court explained in a child custody
case, the "Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it
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tolerate them." 1
The story of social change told in According to Our Hearts, however, is
more complex. The students Professor Onwuachi-Willig polled emphatically
rejected the idea that race was salient enough to marital identity to warrant
an annulment; in fact, they largely thought the hypothetical husband who
wanted the annulment was a racist. 148 Their written comments included
statements such as "if you love someone it shouldn't matter what half of
their gene code says," "race should never be a reason to get a marriage
annulled and the guy is ridiculous for thinking that is a good reason" and
even "[t]his is a stupid question."' 149 Yet Professor Onwuachi-Willig shows
in great detail in According to Our Hearts that, for most Americans, race
does factor into the decision to marry, and affects, sometimes unconsciously,
whether someone falls in love with a particular person. 5 0 Even as students
and judges reject the legal salience of race, its social salience remains. There
is no room any more for race in annulment law-nor should there be. But
just as annulment law historically refused to recognize the importance of
economics in marriage, it now also refuses to recognize the importance of
race, and is thus an incomplete measure of what marriage means today.
Perhaps annulment law represents the ideal to which we aspire-a
colorblind society. According to Our Hearts helps us to see the disjunction
between this aspiration and reality.
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